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ABSTRACT 
 
 Despite the large body of literature produced by researchers attentive to the subjects 
of military intervention and the historical period known as the Cold War, little attention has 
been given to the effect that the tensions that existed during this time period on a global scale 
had on military interventions.  Why have previous scholars missed this and why is it 
important?  The body of existing literature looks at the effect the Cold War had on individual 
countries and examines individual conflicts, but overall trends are not examined in depth.  
This thesis proposes some theoretical propositions based on realist and constructivist 
literature, to explain why proxy conflicts (military interventions perpetrated on any state 
excluding the rival state) would decrease after the Cold War.  This document examines this 
effect using the two most historically prolific military interveners of the time period, the 
United States of America and the Soviet Union/Russia, as proxies for the overall effect that 
the Cold War had on the global system with respect to military interventions.1  This thesis 
approaches the topic utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods.  Qualitatively, it 
uses a case study of both states’ interventions in Afghanistan, one before and one after the 
Cold War. The case study found that, though there were small distinctions, there was no 
substantive difference in intervention before and after the Cold War.  Quantitatively, this 
document utilizes data from the International Military Intervention Dataset to examine 
statistically the effect the Cold War had on the rate of military interventions during the 
identified time period.  It found that, contrary to expectations, there was a constraining effect 
                                                 
1 Deduced using the IMI dataset and looking at overall military interventions during the period.   
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with respect to the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  It also found that in general, 
regardless of the time frame, the United States was a more interventionist state.
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
In a world with increasingly tense relations with China and a resurgent Russia, the 
question of what the future holds with regards to international relations is a very pertinent issue.  
China is increasing their hold on southeast Asia, is pushing their claims in the Pacific, and is 
poised to overtake the United States as the economic superpower.  Russia is revitalized and is 
pushing its weight around in its historical backyard with the support of the rebels in Ukraine, the 
outright annexation of Crimea, and the constant use of cyberwarfare. Either state could 
potentially be the future rival for United States hegemony.  Will this lead to a direct conflict 
between the United States and these countries?  This is unlikely as these countries also both have 
the superweapon that constrained direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War era, nuclear weapons.  That is not to say that there will not be conflicts 
between the rivals; but that conflict will most likely be fought between the proxies of those rivals 
in their sphere of influence and against nonaligned countries to increase their own sphere of 
influence.  What support is there for that assertion?  This study finds support by examining the 
military interventions of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, when there 
was that same nuclear weapon constraint.   
Military interventions are a controversial phenomenon in the modern international 
system.  Modern states are sovereign beings and, as such, they enjoy the sole right to the 
legitimate use of force within the borders of their nation.  Military intervention is defined by the 
United States Department of Defense as “the deliberate act of a nation or group of nations to 
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introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy”2.  Military interventions 
impact today’s world in a variety of ways.  They can increase the sphere of power of a state but 
they may also be considered as illegitimate by others in the international system.  Why they are 
perpetrated may often be as important as how they are conducted because they will affect the 
balance of power in the international system.   
The Cold War was a rivalry that existed between the two world superpowers of the time 
that never transitioned into a so-called hot war.  It included the buildup of weapons, both 
conventional and nuclear, and the use of military interventions or proxy wars to increase the 
sphere of power of their own state and to decrease or limit the sphere of power of the opposing 
state.  The Cold War dates from 1947, after the end of the second World War, and continued to 
1991, ending with the dissolution of Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.  Therefore, for the 
purposes of this paper, the delineation between during and after the Cold War is 1991.   
What constitutes military intervention? This is less simple than it seems.  Should one just 
include the direct insertion of military troops, colloquially known as boots on the ground, or 
should one consider other factors such as drone strikes or sales of military hardware?  For the 
purposes of this study the definition supplied by Pearson and Baumann 1993 as events involving 
“the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country 
inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute”3 is used.  Utilizing this definition 
means that there are several actions that will be rejected as military intervention because they 
have no direct impact on the military situation of any other nation and would not be considered 
actual use of military.  These non-military actions include disaster assistance, the use of 
                                                 
2 "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,"  (2010). 
3 Pearson, Frederic S., and Robert A. Baumann, “International Military Intervention, 1946-1988,” Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection No 6035, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, (1993).  
3 
 
paramilitaries, the use of government backed militias, private security forces,4 and the training of 
troops not involved in direct combat and other similar actions.5   
To delineate the nature of military intervention and to provide context, this paper includes 
a case study of military intervention which examines the invasions of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union from 1979-1989 and the United States from 2001-2014.  The case study is an attempt to 
isolate the variables that are examined in the statistical portion of this paper, to discuss the nature 
of military intervention, and to make the entire topic more understandable by looking at what is 
behind all the data that is examined in Chapter 5.  The case study clearly demonstrates that 
military interventions in Afghanistan have failed every time a major nation has attempted this 
activity in the modern era.  Nations including the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States of America have tried and failed to invade and exert long term control on the 
Afghani people.  The United States and the Soviet Union, both cases that are examined in this 
study, interfered in the affairs of Afghanistan for very different reasons, utilizing militaries and 
civil administrations that are vastly different in construction, and yet the results of their 
interventions were very similar.   
The most conclusive argument given to explain the similarities between the results of the 
military interventions is the theory of asymmetrical warfare.  Despite differences in the structural 
makeup of the administrations of the United States and the Soviet Union, they faced the same 
problem that is inherent in any great-power military operation, asymmetric warfare.  Asymmetric 
warfare occurs when a conflict is seemingly one-sided with all the military strength being held 
                                                 
4 Kisangani, Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering, “International Military Intervention, 1989-2005,” Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection No 21282, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, (2008).  
5 Grossman, Zoltan, "From Wounded Knee to Syria: A Century of U.S. Military Interventions," Olympia, 
Washington: Evergreen State College, (2014). 
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by the great power.  The flaw that has consistently hurt the great powers is the fact that their 
militaries are geared towards large warfare and their militaries are unable to generate success as 
the enemies do not utilize similar tactics.  Thus, the United States and Soviet Union entered into 
both Afghanistan conflicts with militaries that were structured to fight conventional warfare and 
the Afghani warriors were ultimately successful because they refused to fight this type of battle.   
This paper argues that the rivalry between two nuclear powers: the United States and the 
Soviet Union/Russia, increased the rate of proxy military interventions because direct warfare 
could escalate into mutual destruction.  Subsequently, after the rivalry breaks down or in this 
case the end of the Cold War, this thesis argues that the number of military interventions/proxy 
wars would decrease.  Did the Cold War have a limiting effect on the rate of military 
interventions by the two superpowers of the time, namely the United States and the Soviet Union 
(Russia)?  This thesis will examine military interventions that the nation-states of the Soviet 
Union/Russia and the United States of America have participated in during the nineteen years 
preceding and the nineteen years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
corresponding end of the Cold War.  These years are used because data is only available up to 
2010 and it is important to keep the years even for this test to ensure balance.  This thesis 
hypothesizes that the Cold War had an accelerating effect on the occasions for military 
intervention on proxies by these two countries.  To verify this thesis, several empirical tests are 
used to examine actual instances of military intervention.     
This study endeavors to examine military intervention using the United States and the 
Soviet Union/Russia as examples that illustrate the effect the Cold War had on military 
intervention and why these interventions were perpetrated on proxies rather than becoming direct 
conflicts between the rivals.  Their use as examples is justified because they are the two 
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countries that have intervened in the most conflicts over the past 60 years.  This study aims to 
examine the nature of military intervention through both qualitative and quantitative means.  The 
qualitative method utilizes case studies to examine interventions both before and after the Cold 
War ended.  This work examines the interventions in Afghanistan, by the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War from 1979 to 1989 and by the United States after the end of the Cold War from 
2001 to 2014, in an attempt to examine the differences between them.   
The study then analyzes all qualifying military interventions utilizing a quantitative 
approach incorporating data collected over roughly the past 50 years to determine what statistical 
conclusion can be drawn.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Theoretical Analysis 
In this section the attempt is made to utilize realist literature with a bit of constructivism 
to form theoretical propositions regarding military interventions which occur from rivals that 
have the capability to destroy each other if they engage in direct warfare.  The basic components 
are:  states are the most important actor in the international system;6 states care about security 
whether it be through the lens of maximizing security also known as offensive realism7 or 
satisficing security also known as defensive realism;8 in an anarchical world there are different 
cultures in the world and different classifications of international relations, namely enemies, 
rivals, and friends;9 the United States and the Soviet Union had ideologically divergent systems 
there existed a rivalry between the two states; and states existing in rivalry will engage in 
military interventions to increase their spheres of influence and contain the rival’s sphere of 
influence.  
At a basic level, the theoretical idea to be explored is that the rivalry inherent during the 
Cold War would have had significant effect on the number of military interventions.  
Additionally, this paper examines why the rivalry never evolved past military intervention in 
proxy territory into a direct conflict due to the presence of nuclear deterrence and the potential 
                                                 
6 Waltz, Kenneth N, Theory of international politics, (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979). 
7 Mearsheimer, John J, The tragedy of Great Power politics, (New York: Norton, 2001); Gilpin, Robert, War and 
change in world politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
8 Jervis, Robert, Cooperation under the security dilemma, (Los Angeles: Center for Arms Control and International 
Security, University of California, Los Angeles, 1977); Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of international politics, (Reading, 
Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979). 
9 Wendt, Alexander, Social theory of international politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
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for mutual destruction.   The elephant in the room with these two superpowers is obviously the 
question of nuclear weapons and the effect that mutually assured destruction or MAD would 
have with respect to their willingness to engage in military interventions.  Kenneth Waltz 
explores the effect that nuclear weapons have on the international system and suggests that “they 
(nuclear weapons) make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from 
starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons.”10  This paper makes the 
assumption that Waltz refers to direct conflict between the enemy states and that leaves the 
option of interventions within other states open and, indeed, would even encourage these military 
interventions.  Based on this premise, one would expect that both nations would have more 
interventions and that these interventions would typically be longer during the Cold War than 
afterward.  The following research questions summarize these ideas and propose their 
application to assess the effect of the Cold War, and the concomitant rivalry between the Soviet 
Union / Russia and the United States, on the rate of military intervention.   
• Did the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War 
affect the rate of military interventions? 
• Was the Soviet Union a more interventionist state in the 19 years prior to the Cold War? 
• Was the United States a more interventionist state in the 19 years prior to the Cold War? 
• Was Russia a more interventionist state in the 19 years following the end of the Cold 
War? 
• Was the United States a more interventionist state in the 19 years following the end of the 
Cold War? 
                                                 
10 Waltz, Kenneth N., “The spread of nuclear weapons: more may be better,” London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, (1981). 
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The basis of these ideas is the assumption that the rivalry inherent between the United States 
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War is a causal mechanism for the high rate of military 
interventions.  A natural evolution is that, after the end of the Cold War, the rate of military 
interventions by both parties would decrease because there is no longer this competition for 
power between two relatively equal superpowers.  Another aspect to consider is the ratio of 
military interventions and what this signals with respect to the effects of the Cold War.  Thus, the 
hypotheses for this research are as follows:   
 
Hypotheses 
H0: The Cold War had no effect on the absolute rate of military interventions by 
both the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia). 
HA1: The Cold War positively affected the rate of military interventions by both 
the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia). (i.e. there were more military 
interventions by both sides during the Cold War) 
HA2: The Cold War negatively affected the rate of military interventions by both 
the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia). (i.e. there were less military 
interventions by both sides during the Cold War) 
HA3: The United States was a more interventionist state than the Soviet Union 
during the 19 years prior to the end of the Cold War. 
HA4: The Soviet Union was a more interventionist state than the United States 
during the 19 years prior to the end of the Cold War. 
HA5: The United States was a more interventionist state than Russia during the 19 
years following the end of the Cold War. 
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HA6:  Russia was a more interventionist state than the United States during the 19 
years following the end of the Cold War.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Many of these hypotheses are not directly related to the core theory but have been included in this study so as 
to make it comprehensive in nature. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A preliminary overview of the literature examining military interventions shows a 
breadth of knowledge already published in this area.  There has been extensive consideration of 
military intervention in general, with a focus on the United States intervention in the post-Cold 
War World.  What existing literature does not cover extensively is both detailed Soviet 
intervention and a comparative overview of military intervention by both the United States and 
Russia/Soviet Union, the predictors for their actions, how their relations with each other might 
affect their actions, and what this has to do with possibly predicting and explaining future 
military intervention by both states and by all states in general.  Three sets of literature that 
pertain to this research are general theories of military intervention, United States military 
intervention, and Russian/Soviet military intervention.  This review of the literature will 
conclude with an examination of the literature necessary to create the foundation for the 
propositions examined in this thesis.   
General Theories of Military Intervention 
 Military intervention has traditionally been utilized to defend or maximize national 
interests such as land or critical resources.  Over the past few decades, and especially since the 
end of the Cold War, military intervention has regularly been advocated as an action that was 
legal and was the responsibility of developed nations to rebuild failed states or stop humanitarian 
atrocities.  Andrea Kathryn Talentino examines this evolution in her book “Military Intervention 
after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice.”  In this book, she uncovers the 
change in the acceptability of military intervention and examines why, even though state 
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building is referred to as the reason for intervention, successful rebuilding of states due to 
intervention is rare.12  She also examines this dynamic and how the existence of failed states 
allows for and, at times, actively supports both criminal actors and terrorist organizations; and 
how this attitude can lead to intervention.13  Talentino provides insight into the underlying basics 
of military intervention and why so many interventions are ultimately unsuccessful.   
 Humanitarian intervention has become one of the most common criteria for military 
intervention within a state.  While this seems to be rational, in practice it seems the humanitarian 
justification has been largely for show.  Thomas Weiss, in his book “Humanitarian Intervention: 
Ideas in Action,” examines this topic.  Weiss researches the foundational element of sovereignty 
and how humanitarian interventions affect this.  In his book, he outlines the components of 
military intervention for humanitarian reasons, which include the level of military commitment, 
the continuum of state sovereignty and state consent, and the fluidity of consent.14 This book 
provides clear insight into the world interactions in humanitarian intervention, which in turn 
explains how military intervention has evolved over the last decade.   
There has been less examination of the relationship between Russia and the West and 
how this affects their military intervention policies.  In the book, “Russia, the West, and Military 
Intervention”, author Roy Allison examines the extant literature (as of 2013) on military 
interventions to evaluate Russia’s role in international society and examines how their 
relationship with the states of the west and their relative normative values affect their stance on 
the legality of military intervention.15  This book was the closest to the topic to be investigated in 
                                                 
12 Talentino, Andrea Kathryn, Military Intervention after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice, (Ohio 
University Press, 2005). 
13 Ibid. 
14Weiss, Thomas G., Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 
15 Allison, Roy, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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this study and utilizes a comparative approach to examine trends since the end of the Cold War.  
Allison’s book is useful as a starting point, but this study is focused on both the Russo-American 
relationship and extending the premise to examine predictors of intervention and comparing 
instances of intervention.   
 Another facet of military intervention that has been studied is the coalitions led by the 
United States.  Sarah Kreps, in her book “Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military 
Interventions after the Cold War”, examines the military interventions perpetrated by the United 
States after the end of the Cold War.  The author indicates in her research of the major 
interventions conducted by the United States, both in concert with other states and those 
conducted unilaterally, that there has been a shift in perceptions on what is acceptable for 
interventions over the past two decades.  Her position is that the Iraq War had a profound effect 
on what is acceptable by a state, with unilateralism becoming unacceptable and multilateral 
actions, especially those that are sanctioned by the United Nations, becoming the more 
fashionable and acceptable form of military intervention.16 This book is relevant for this research 
because it examines United States military interventions, especially in the context of coalitions.   
United States Military Intervention 
Several scholarly works have been published discussing United States military 
intervention both before and after the end of the Cold War.  The main book useful for this thesis 
with regards to United States military intervention is “US Military Strategy and the Cold War 
Endgame” by Stephen J. Cimbala.  Cimbala examines the Cold War armed forces of the United 
States, the escalation paradox, and the military strategy of the United States.17   
                                                 
16 Naumann, Klaus, “NATO, Kosovo, and Military Intervention,” Global Governance, Vol8(1), (2002). 
17 Cimbala, Stephen J., US Military Strategy and the Cold War Endgame, (Ilford, Essex, England: F. Cass, 1995). 
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Two time periods are examined within this thesis, so it is appropriate to discuss the 
literature with this timeline in mind as well. One author who examined United States 
intervention during the Cold War was Michael Butler. Butler investigated the decision for 
military intervention through the lens of the just war theory. He proposed, and found support for, 
the theory that United States “simultaneously assumed the role of ideological warrior and 
champion of the free world while also relying on a measure of multilateralism.”18 There are two 
other authors who also looked at United State Cold War interventions.  They are both proponents 
of a hegemonic viewpoint: Evan Luard and J.H. Peterson.  They propose that U.S. behavior with 
regards to military intervention splits from the international norms of noninterference due to 
sovereignty more often and in greater force when the country or location in question was within 
their sphere of influence, namely that of Latin America.19  Another perspective regarding 
intervention focused on structural realism and one of the main proponents in this school of 
thought was Mortan Kaplan.  Kaplan proposed that military intervention by the United States can 
be best understood with respect to the bi-polarity inherent in the international system of the time 
and the importance of maintaining the stability of that system.20  The final major school of 
thought explains United States interventions using ideological factors as rational justification.  
Two scholars with this view are Mark Katz and Samuel Huntington.  They contend that the 
                                                 
18 Butler, Michael J., “U.S. Military Intervention in Crisis, 1945-1994: An Empirical Inquiry of Just War Theory,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.47, No.2, (2003). 
19 Petersen, J. H., Economic interests and U.S. foreign policy in Latin America: An empirical approach, (In The 
politics of aid, trade and investment, edited by S. Raichur and C. Liske, New York: Russell Sage, 1976); Luard, Evan, 
Conflict and peace in the modern international system, (London: Macmillan, 1988). 
20Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in international politics, (New York: John Wiley, 1957).   
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desire to spread liberal democracy and combat communism were the largest drivers of U.S. 
military intervention during the Cold War.21 
The first of the literature to be examined with regards U.S. military intervention in the 
post-Cold War world is “Innovation and Precedent in the Kosovo War: The Impact of Operation 
Allied Force on US Foreign Policy” by David Hastings Dunn and “NATO, Kosovo, and Military 
Intervention” by Klaus Naumann.  These are two significant articles that scrutinize the Kosovo 
conflict and the resulting intervention.  The Dunn article focuses on US foreign policy 
innovation and the increase in humanitarian intervention that it was signaling.  It also looks at the 
environment the Kosovo intervention fostered in the United States and how this environment 
could have contributed to later interventions by the United States.22  The shorter Naumann article 
considers how this intervention was viewed by the international community.  Naumann posits 
that unilateral and even regional interventions are increasingly viewed as illegal by the 
international community and that the Kosovo conflict is one of the events influencing this 
trend.23   
  Many people focus on the Iraq war as the single event that signaled the change from 
unilateral intervention to multilateral intervention.  This study’s intention is to indicate that, 
while the Iraq war is important to this story, there were other factors and events impacting this 
development and the Kosovo intervention is one of these factors.   
                                                 
21 Huntington, Samuel P., “Patterns of intervention: America and the Soviets in the Third World,” National Interest 
Vol. 7, (1987); Katz, Mark N., “Beyond the Reagan Doctrine: Reassessing U.S. policy toward regional conflicts,” 
Washington Quarterly. Vol. 14, (1991). 
22 Dunn, David Hastings, “Innovation and Precedent in the Kosovo War: the Impact of Operation Allied Force on US 
Foreign Policy,” International Affairs, Vol.85(3), (2003). 
23 Naumann, Klaus, “NATO, Kosovo, and Military Intervention,” Global Governance, Vol8(1), (2002). 
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 The next body of literature to be explored is that covering the conflicts in the Middle 
East, specifically Iraq and Afghanistan.  There is a plethora of research covering this topic, 
especially the United States’ involvement in the area.   Some of the works covering this topic 
include: “Military Intervention in Iraq: Security, Democracy and War against Terrorism” by 
Malik Chaouch, “Western Imperialism in the Middle East: The Case of the United States’ 
Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf” by George Klay Kieh, and “Public Support for 
Military Intervention Across Levels of Political Information and Stages of Intervention: The 
Case of the Iraq War” by C. V. Sirin.  The Kieh article delves into the first Gulf War and while 
the author approaches it from the view of imperialism, it is a serious investigation into the 
intervention and the possible aftermath of this action, namely instability in the region.24 Both of 
the other articles focus on the Iraq War, with Chaouch exploring the effects of this war on the 
international community and questioning the reasons for intervention25 while Sirin scrutinized 
the public support within the United States for the Iraq war and how/why this support 
fluctuated.26 
Russian Military Intervention 
This study also intends to examine the instances of Russian and Soviet intervention, 
which, although not as well documented as the United States instances, are just as controversial.  
Some of the important interventions include Czechoslovakia, Yemen, and Ethiopia.  One seminal 
                                                 
24 Kieh, George Klay, “Western Imperialism in the Middle East: The Case of the United States’ Military Intervention 
in the Persian Gulf,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.14(1), (2002). 
25 Malik, Chaouch, “Military Intervention in Iraq: Security, Democracy, and War Against Terrorism,” Historia Critica, 
Jul. Issue 26, (2003). 
26 Sirin, C. V., “Public Support for Military Interventions across Levels of Political Information and Stages of 
Intervention: The Case of the Iraq War,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol.38(2), (2012). 
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example of Soviet intervention during the Cold War, namely that of Afghanistan, is explored in 
depth later in this work in the case study section.   
Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria are three of the main instances of intervention for Russia 
since the end of the Cold War.  Some articles examining Russian instances of intervention in the 
South Caucus region are “Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force: Russia’s Great 
Power Identities and Military Intervention in Abkhazia” by Ted Hopf, “Russia Resurgent? 
Moscow’s campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’” by Roy Allison, “Securing the South 
Caucasus: Military Aspects of Russian Policy towards the Region since 2008” by Tracey 
German and “The Tagliavini Report Revisited: Jus ad Bellum and the Legality of the Russian 
Intervention in Georgia” by Alexander Lott27.  The Hopf research covers Russian intervention in 
the Abkhazia region of Georgia in the 1990s and posits that it was an illegitimate action.28  The 
Allison article regarding Georgia focuses on the activities of 2008, with the military incursion 
into Georgia and the formal recognition by Russia of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.29  A second 
instance of Russian intervention is the intervention in Ukraine, which is covered in the article 
“Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules” by Roy 
Allison.  In Allison’s examination of the crisis in Ukraine, he reviews the civil war in Ukraine, 
the Russian intervention in the conflict, and the annexation of the Crimea peninsula.  A third 
significant instance of Russian intervention is that of the ongoing conflict in Syria.  This 
intervention is inspected in the article “Russia, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility 
to Protect: the Case of Syria” by Derek Averre and Lance Davies.  Averre and Davies probe this 
                                                 
27 Lott, Alexander, “The Tagliavini Report Revisited: Jus ad Bellum and the Legality of the Russian Intervention in 
Georgia,” Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 28(74), (2012): 4–21. 
28 Hopf, Ted, “Identity, Legitimacy, and the use of Military Force: Russia’s Great Power identities and Military 
Intervention in Abkhazia,” Review of International Studies, Vol.31(S1), (2005). 
29 Allison, Roy, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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situation in which Russia has ignored humanitarian concerns that are the current imprimatur for 
intervention and supporting the Assad regime.30   
The Foundation of the Theory 
Kenneth Waltz takes the position that the state is the most important actor in the 
international system.  There are many proponents of examining the actors at the subnational and 
the supranational levels but Waltz effectively argues against both sides.  With regards to 
subnational units he states that it “is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking 
inside of states”31 because it would lead to a huge increase in variables with any observable 
phenomenon that would require the addition of new unit level variables.  With respect to 
supranational arguments Waltz states that structures in the international system are not direct 
causes but they “act through socialization of the actors and through competition between them.” 
32  Waltz shows that although there are merits to examining the international system using 
different levels of analysis, the state remains the most important actor in any discussion of the 
international system.   
The second argument is that states, as the most important actor, care about security.  This 
is firmly grounded in realist thought and is a basic assumption of realism.  For the purposes of 
this study there are two main schools of realist literature with regards to security, namely 
offensive realism and defensive realism.  Offensive realism, first postulated by John 
Mearsheimer, postulates that great powers are power-maximizing and always looking towards 
the ultimate aim of dominating the international system.  He finds that states can never be certain 
                                                 
30 Averre, Derek and Lance Davies, “Russia, Humanitarian, Intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect: The Case 
of Syria,” International Affairs, Vol 91(4), (2015). 
31 Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of international politics, (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979). 
32 Ibid.  
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of the intentions of other states and since the primary goal of states is survival, the maximization 
of their own power is going to always be the focus over just maintaining the balance of power. If 
Mearsheimer’s position holds, then “the world is condemned to perpetual great power 
competition” 33 which can be translated in the constant increase in a state’s power regardless of 
the presence of a rival.  The second pertinent school of thought is that of defensive realism, first 
espoused by Kenneth Waltz.  This position indicates that the anarchic system encourages states 
to pursue defensive and moderate policies and that “their first concern is not to maximize power 
but to maintain their position in the system”34 which can be visualized as the view that as long as 
a state maintains dominance there is little need for the continuance of the expansion of their 
power base. 
Next, this study examines the development of cultures and how these will affect the ways 
in which states will interact in the international system.  Alexander Wendt pictures the 
international system in three different ways: Hobbesian with states assuming other states are 
potential enemies, Lockean with states assuming other states are potential rivals, or Kantian with 
states assuming that other states are potential friends.35  Given that realism puts security as the 
primary concern, the two positions that are examined in this paper are enemies and rivals.  In a 
Hobbesian system, the states would pursue a maximizing approach to power in international 
relations because they would view all other states as potential enemies and, to safeguard security, 
they would maximize their own power.  In a Lockean system, the states would pursue a status-
quo or satisficing approach to power in international relations because they would view other 
states as potential rivals and therefore would pursue a status quo option.  In a maximizing 
                                                 
33 Mearsheimer, John J., The tragedy of Great Power politics, (New York: Norton, 2001). 
34 Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of international politics, (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979). 
35 Wendt, Alexander, Social theory of international politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
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scenario, we would see an increase of interventions by the United States and a decrease of 
interventions by Russia after the Cold War because the victorious party would rapidly increase 
their interventions to occupy the space of the losing party.  In a status quo scenario (which is the 
main hypothesis of this study) one would tend to see a decrease in both parties’ interventions 
after the Cold War, with Russia’s decrease being due to being the losing party and the United 
States decrease being due the lack of a rival they need to compete against.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDIES: INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Comparing Both Invasions 
 This case study’s purpose is to approach the question of military intervention from a 
qualitative point of view with the goal of isolating relevant variables.  By examining military 
interventions in the same nation but perpetrated by different countries and in different time 
periods, with the Soviet Union intervening during the Cold War and the United States 
intervening after the end of the Cold War, readers may discover whether the Cold War had any 
effect on the interventions themselves.  The case study is divided into three portions.  In the first 
portion, the period leading up to the intervention is examined to look for possible reasons for the 
intervention.  The second portion scrutinizes the conflict itself and how it was conducted by both 
actors.  The third section examines the withdrawal period and hypothesizes on potential reasons 
for the withdrawal and whether or not the intervention was a failure.  This case study illustrates 
how military interventions typically occur by providing an in-depth examination and comparison 
of the invasions of Afghanistan by the United States and the Soviet Union.   
Before Intervention 
The circumstances that led up to the military interventions in Afghanistan vary 
dramatically between the United States and the Soviet Union.  The United States intervention 
occurred over ten years after the end of the Cold War.  For the United States, the intervention 
was a result of a catastrophic terrorist attack on both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
on September 11, 2001.  The intervention was retaliation against the Taliban controlled 
government of Afghanistan which had allowed the terrorist attackers a safe harbor.  In contrast, 
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the Soviet Union’s motivation for military intervention was very different.  The Soviet 
intervention was more of a war of their own making as it was inspired by the geopolitical 
competition engendered by the Cold War.36  While it is true that the Soviets were invited to 
intervene by Afghanistan’s then communist government, that government did not enjoy 
widespread support and was not representative of the population.  Therefore, utilizing this 
intervention is justified due to the perceived illegitimacy of the Afghani government by the 
populace.  Basically, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan as an attempt to tip the scale of 
political influence in the region away from the United States and towards the Soviet Union.  The 
contrast between the two military interventions could not be clearer: one was a response to a 
direct military attack while the other was an attempt to shift the balance of power in the region.   
Next, consideration should be made of the domestic situation of both states and how this 
could affect their willingness and ability to intervene.  The time preceding the Soviet 
intervention in 1979 was during the latter years of the rule of Leonid Brezhnev as leader of the 
Soviet Union.  This period is commonly characterized as the “Period of Stagnation” in which 
“the Soviet economy entered a period of stagnation from which it never recovered.”37 This could 
have affected the Soviet willingness to intervention as they would be searching for ways to 
transfer their issues onto a someone or something else in order to distract attention from 
domestic problems.  The domestic situation of the United States in the period preceding their 
intervention into Afghanistan in 2001 is rocky as well.  They were just recovering from the dot 
com bubble bursting and were reeling from the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  Both of 
                                                 
36 Kuchins, Andrew C., “The Soviet and U.S. Experiences in Military Intervention in Afghanistan and Current U.S.-
Russian Cooperation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, (2011).   
37 1964-1982 – The Period of Stagnation. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/cccp-history-period-
of-stagnation.htm (accessed on February 20, 2017). 
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these events could have affected the United States motivations for military intervention.  This 
shows that the domestic situation has a possible effect upon the chance for a state to intervene 
militarily and would be a potential intervening variable.   
When examining for potential variables that would affect a nation’s willingness or ability 
to intervene militarily, the situation of the global system and how that state is interacting within 
that system also must be considered.  The 1970s was a time of economic stress and was one of 
the worst times for industrialized countries’ performance since the Great Depression.38  
Economic growth rates slowed considerably during this time period for both the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  There were oil shocks and high rates of inflation throughout most of the 
decade and stagnation of the economies of the much of the Soviet bloc.39  Issues with economic 
stagnation and oil shocks could be a potential factor in why the Soviet Union intervened in 
Afghanistan as it is a potential location for much mineral and oil wealth. 
  The decade preceding the United States intervention was a time of both positives and 
negatives.  It was a time of extreme advances in technology such as the internet, computers, and 
the cell phone; and in capitalism with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War.  It was also an era of renewed ethnic tensions, the rise of right-wing extremism40, and the 
re-birth of nationalism.  These rising tensions, especially in the Middle East, could be especially 
important in the reasoning for United States intervention.   The world situation can have a 
potential influence in motivations or willingness to intervene and, as such, is a potential 
extraneous factor.  There are many other potential extraneous factors that could have affected the 
                                                 
38 Frum, David, How We Got Here: The '70s. (New York: Basic Books, 2000): 292–293. 
39  1964-1982 – The Period of Stagnation. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/cccp-history-
period-of-stagnation.htm (accessed on February 20, 2017). 
40 Weinberg, Leonard, Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century (Political Violence), (Routledge; Rev ed., 
2004). 
23 
 
decision to enter into a military intervention in both instances that can be further explored in 
future work.  In the cases of both domestic situation and world situation there is an attempt to 
control for these factors in the regression conducted later in this paper so as to attempt to tease 
out whether the cold war truly had an effect.   
During Intervention 
  When the specifics of each invasion are examined, they are drastically different as 
well.  The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 due to their fear of a 
collapse of the extremely unpopular local communist government.  They sent 30,000 troops in 
armored columns across the border at two locations, at Termez in the northeast and at Kushka in 
the northwest.  They also sent commandoes by air to the capital at Kabul to seize strategic 
locations in the city.  The two armored columns followed the main highway and continued on to 
meet at the capital.  After a week of fighting and many deaths, the Afghani president was killed 
and a new one was installed by the Soviets on December 29th.41  
 
Image 1. Sourced from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7883532.stm. 
                                                 
41 “Timeline: Soviet war in Afghanistan,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7883532.stm. 
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The United States invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 as a reaction to the 9/11 
attacks after the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, the terrorist leader who 
instigated those attacks.  In contrast to the Soviet invasion, very few ground troops were initially 
used by the United States.  Their main tactic in the early stages of the war was to utilize airstrikes 
and only 1300 ground troops were initially deployed.  It took longer for the United States forces 
to take control of the country than it did the Soviets.  By November 13th the Taliban had been 
evicted from the capital of Kabul and by December 7th their stronghold at Kandahar was taken 
by United States troops, though top Taliban leadership escaped.   On June 13th of 2002 a new 
Afghani head of state was elected who was friendlier to American forces.42  This was how the 
initial stages of each war went.   
 Following this initial stage of the interventions, both sides maintained their presence 
within Afghanistan in order to continue their interests and achieve their goals.  The Soviets, due 
to the intransigence of the mujahedeen rebels, increased their occupation force by 50,000 
soldiers which brought their total up to 80,000 troops.  This is the rough number that they 
maintained for five years, until 1985, when Gorbachev increased that number by an additional 
30,000 troops in an effort to quickly win the war.  This led to the bloodiest year of the war to 
date.43  In contrast, the initial troop count of American forces remained relatively low for the first 
portion of the occupation.  This study will observe just U.S troop numbers, though they operated 
in tandem with other NATO forces.  In August of 2003, NATO deployed 11,000 troops for 
peacekeeping purposes and the United States had roughly 10,000 troops at this point in the 
country.  By September of 2008, there were 31,000 United States troops in Afghanistan.  Under 
                                                 
42 “The War in Afghanistan: A Timeline,” CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-war-in-afghanistan-a-
timeline/. 
43 “Timeline: Soviet war in Afghanistan,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7883532.stm. 
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President Obama’s initiative to win the war against the insurgents, over 40,000 troops were 
added in 2009, bringing the total up to 71,000 United States troops.44  Clearly, there are many 
similarities between the interventions and, while both include a troop surge as an attempt to 
quickly end the fighting, these troop surges were ultimately unsuccessful.  In both cases the 
invaders were working with allied Afghani governments that were propped up by the invading 
forces.  Both sides tried the “surge” strategy in an attempt to shorten what was becoming a 
protracted struggle. 
Withdrawal and Aftermath of Intervention 
 The withdrawal phase is the final aspect.  Both countries had huge numbers of troops 
within Afghanistan that were costing exorbitant amounts to maintain.  At their peak, the Soviets 
had approximately 110,000 troops within the country and the United States had roughly 90,000 
troops within the country.45  The Soviet Union began its withdrawal in 1988 and by February 15, 
1989, the last Soviet troops had left Afghanistan.  Over one million Afghans and 13,000 Soviet 
troops had been killed during this decade long war.46 The joint United States and NATO 
withdrawal began in 2011 with most of the NATO troops being withdrawn relatively quickly.  
On December 28, 2014, NATO officially ended combat operations within Afghanistan.47  For the 
purposes of this study the United States is characterized as failing in their intervention into 
Afghanistan because the United States ended its combat operations without completing all of 
their objectives. The argument can be made that the war was not a failure and, indeed, that the 
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timeline/. 
45 Landler, Mark and Helene Cooper, "Obama Will Speed Pullout From War in Afghanistan," The New York Times, 
(June 2011). 
46 “Timeline: Soviet war in Afghanistan,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7883532.stm. 
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war is still ongoing as there are still troops in the country.  However, the official mission was 
ended without completing all of the stated objectives and the troops currently in country are there 
for a different mission with new objectives.  Though the war had ended, NATO and United 
States troops would remain in a limited way with Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and Operation 
Resolute Support, which were missions intended to “train, advise, and assist the Afghan security 
forces and institutions.”48  As of May 2016, this mission had 12,813 troops in country, and 6,954 
of them were United States troops.   
 
Image 2. Sourced from http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/20160518_rsmplacemat.pdf. 
                                                 
48 “NATO Resolute Support Mission: Key Facts and Figures”. NATO. 
http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/20160518_rsmplacemat.pdf 
27 
 
While both invasions / interventions began very differently, much of the warfare was conducted 
in similar ways.  The difference between them that is pertinent for this study is the reason for the 
invasions themselves.  The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to protect their hegemonic interests 
against their rivals in a bipolar world; whereas the United Sates invaded as a response to a 
terrorist attack and an attempt to eradicate the presence of terrorist support within Afghanistan.  
Another question that needs to be asked is why did the two most powerful countries of their 
times fail to win a war in a relatively insignificant country.  The answer to that question can be 
explained by asymmetric warfare.   
 
Asymmetric Warfare 
  
What is asymmetric warfare? According to Major Robert M. Cassidy, asymmetric 
warfare is “whenever a great power faces a pre-industrial and semi-feudal enemy who is 
intrinsically compelled to mitigate the great power’s numerous advantages with cunning and 
asymmetry.”49  While this is a good definition, the pre-industrial criterion seems to be needlessly 
specific to the instances of the war in Afghanistan.  One could view asymmetric warfare in any 
conflict in which the great power intervenes militarily within a country that has primitive 
technology in comparison, which then forces them to fight with guerrilla tactics and eschew the 
traditional ways to fight wars.  At a basic level, the great power does poorly in these small-scale 
wars due to the structure of their military and other factors that constrain the actions of great 
powers militarily; they cannot escape a big-war paradigm when conducting any war.50 
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There are “paradoxes” that accompany this type of asymmetric warfare, which lead to the 
“failure” of the great power.  Any great power, when confronted with the invasion of a much 
weaker power, brings potentially overwhelming resources and technology to the conflict, yet 
they often do not prevail.  Why is this?  Often it is because the “inferior” opponent exhibits the 
ability and willingness to accept high costs and to persevere in the face of great odds since they 
are often fighting for their survival.  The United States and Soviet Union were invading another 
state, while the local Afghanis were fighting for their homes, for their families, and for their way 
of life.   
The example of the people of Afghanistan, a state comparatively inferior in strength to 
their invaders, persevering against a great power due to asymmetric conflict is not new.  
Throughout history there are examples of great powers failing in similar circumstances: the 
Romans in the Teutoburg Forest area in Germania, the British Empire in the American War of 
Independence, the United States in Vietnam, and many other examples.  The differences between 
these examples and the numerous times that great powers were victorious over lesser powers is 
that in these cases the lesser powers refused to fight the great power on their own terms.51  The 
invaded states did not fight the great powers using tactics similar to the great powers; they 
utilized asymmetrical methods such as insurgency, low intensity conflict, and guerrilla tactics. 
Military interventions in Afghanistan have failed every time a major nation has attempted 
such an intervention in the modern era.  Though they have vastly larger amount of resources, 
great nations have the inability to win wars with smaller powers that refuse to respond with 
conventional warfare.  The United States and the Soviet Union, both cases that are examined in 
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this study, interfered in the affairs of Afghanistan for very different reasons, utilizing militaries 
and civil administrations that are vastly different in construction, and yet the end result of their 
interventions are very similar.  A viable explanation for why these two superpowers, which had 
vastly different structures, both failed to overcome relatively weak opponents in almost the exact 
way is the asymmetrical warfare issue.  Both of these powers, because they are constrained in 
their warfare techniques and abilities due to their great power status, are unable to successfully 
adapt to fight counterinsurgency warfare.  They are intrinsically designed to fight other states on 
the battlefield and to pursue strategic targets.  This is unattainable in these insurgency wars 
because the enemy utilizes techniques such as hit and run attacks, IEDs and roadside bombing 
attacks, and utilizing the local populace to hide, which the great power cannot combat 
effectively.   
There are several conclusions that can be drawn for future wars between great powers 
and lesser ones.  For the great powers, there needs to be either an ability to field units that can 
utilize the same tactics as the local (such as gaining allies amongst the local populace to hide 
with, bombing the insurgents, and the willingness to take the fight to the end) or the acceptance 
of the use of brutal repression and retaliation against the local populace to reduce the number of 
locals willing to aid the insurgents.  Some suggestions for future small powers that might be 
invaded would be to utilize these insurgency techniques.  The smaller powers should not attempt 
to fight the great power on their own terms as this will lead to definite loss.   
This case study endeavors to make a qualitative examination of military intervention by 
looking at the interventions in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and United States.  Though there 
are many similarities and differences between these two military actions, this document 
postulates that the Cold War did not have a significant effect on these instances of intervention.  
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The Cold War had no effect on these two interventions possibly due to the failure of this paper’s 
supposition or possibly because there are extraneous factors that qualitative studies cannot 
examine.  If there was going to be an effect, it would have been observed during these two 
interventions as they were typical interventions.  They are typical interventions based on the 
criteria that they were perpetrated upon a weaker country by one of the states examined and there 
were actual troop invasions.  Though the invasions took different means and used different 
tactics, there were few substantive differences in the course of the interventions and both failed 
due to the same flaws.  While there are more complete analyses of these two interventions in the 
literature52 the similarities in how the wars were conducted, how they were concluded, and their 
effects upon both the states invading and the state being invaded, outweigh the differences of 
ideology and circumstances.  Using this case study, several possible variables can be teased out 
for use in the quantitative study.  These variables include the states’ capabilities, reasons for 
intervention, time period (Cold War or after), strength of alliances, and the nations themselves.   
Although the reason for the initial actions varied significantly, there are numerous 
similarities between the circumstances and the results of both interventions.  Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union could have been considered to be in their prime with respect to 
global power and influence; however, by the time of their withdrawal, both states were facing 
huge domestic, economic, and political crises.  While the interventions in Afghanistan are not the 
root cause of these problems, it is interesting to consider the parallels between them.  Both states 
were also faced with fighting counterinsurgency warfare, which they were ill-equipped to do, 
while the enemy was supplied and found refuge in the border region of Pakistan, which was 
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31 
 
nearly impossible to combat.  Both states were attempting to supplement their military efforts 
with economic development support and political rapport-building with dissidents, which largely 
failed due to the deep corruption that was endemic to Afghanistan.  Attempts were made by both 
states to coordinate policy on key issues such as governance, economic development, and others, 
which failed in both instances due to inefficient, ineffective or counterproductive officials.  Both 
instances of intervention also had the participation of more than one administration, which led to 
changing policy directives midway through the interventions.   In both cases the invaders were 
able to seize control over the political centers, but vast swathes of land were left in insurgent 
hands because there was little strategic value in fighting over small towns.  Finally, in both cases, 
though attempts were made to fight a counterinsurgency based war, the militaries of both 
countries were unable to adapt to these new circumstances due to the built-in power structure of 
their militaries, namely the constraint to fight traditional warfare.  There are numerous lessons 
that should have been drawn by the United States based on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.  
These lessons are: the Afghani government needs to establish legitimacy, the border regions with 
Pakistan need to be considered, conventional military tactics are poor counterinsurgency tools, 
and ethnic tensions need to be considered. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODS AND DATA 
 
Before I begin the quantitative analysis, it is first important to describe the data and the 
process by which data was collected.  I utilized data gathered from the International Military 
Intervention data set collected initially by Pearson and Baumann in 1993 and updated by 
Kisangani and Pickering in 2008.53  “The International Military Intervention (IMI) data set 
records events involving “the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, 
etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” (Pearson and 
Baumann, 1993, 1). Paramilitaries, government backed militias, private security forces, and other 
military units that are not part of the regular uniformed military of the state are excluded.  
Similarly, events must be purposeful, not accidental.  Foreign military interventions are the result 
of conscious decisions by national leaders.  Random or inadvertent border crossings are not 
recorded, nor are unintentional confrontations between fighter planes or naval ships.   In all, 
1,114 cases meeting these criteria are cataloged for the years 1946 to 2005.  Twenty-seven 
separate pieces of information are coded for each case in an attempt to capture multiple 
dimensions of the intervention.  Analysts can easily separate out and focus on the forms of 
intervention (supportive, hostile, humanitarian, territorial, etc.) that are relevant to their 
research.”54  With regards to the data actually used in this study, there was an initial motion to 
                                                 
53 From 1946 to 1988: Pearson, Frederic S., and Robert A. Baumann, “International Military Intervention, 1946-
1988,” Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection No 6035, University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, (1993); From 1989 to 2005: Kisangani, Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering, “International Military 
Intervention, 1989-2005,” Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection No 21282, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, (2008).   
54 Kisangani, Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering, “International Military Intervention, 1989-2005,” Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection No 21282, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, (2008).   
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exclude humanitarian intervention.  Because this paper utilizes a realist foundation to build its 
propositions the decision was made to increase the political capital of the state and increase its 
sphere of power in that way.  Regardless, this is a potentially hazardous way of examining the 
data so it was examined both including and excluding humanitarian interventions and there was 
no significant difference in the results that it produced.     
This combined dataset examined interventions ranging from 1947 to 2005 and I extended 
that timeline to 2010 by utilizing the Correlates of War Militarized International Disputes.55  In 
the MIDs data set I only utilized data that was coded as 4, which is defined in the dataset as the 
explicit use of force, because the other lesser disputes did not fall within my definition of 
military intervention.  To directly test my hypotheses, I construct variables that measure the 
military interventions of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia as a percentage of all 
military interventions conducted through the world from 1946 to 2005.  This measures the 
military intervention activity and controls for the climate in world affairs.  Some years may have 
provoked more military interventions from all countries, thus the percentage method controls for 
this potential effect.  Data regarding capabilities are based on CINC scores that are provided in 
the COW project.  CINC stands for the Composite Index of National Capability and looks at six 
variables to produce this standard.  These variables are total population, urban population, iron 
and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure.56  The 
CINC data is only used to control for the capabilities of the states in question.  There are other 
potential variables which are not examined within these tests that might influence this study.  
                                                 
55 Palmer, Glenn, Vito D'Orazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane, "The MID4 Data Set: Procedures, Coding 
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56 Singer, David J., "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985," 
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These variables might include such things as: the opinion of the United Nations on the 
intervention, the state of the economy of the intervening countries, the state of the economy of 
the country being invaded, the public opinion of the domestic populaces, and many others.  
These are areas in which future studies could expand the significance of the existing literature.   
To look at the generalizability of the conclusions of the case studies, this paper utilizes 
quantitative analysis to provide conclusions about the effect a Cold War type rivalry would have 
on the rate of military interventions. First, I utilize a method with few parametric assumptions to 
analyze the data (chi squared test statistic).  I look at the number of military interventions for 
each country and time period and analyze whether knowing information regarding the time 
period and country would improve the quality of guesses about the number of military 
interventions.  The years looked at within the chi squared range from 1973 to 2010, or the 19 
years during the Cold War and the 19 years after the Cold War.  These years were selected 
because they were the years that data was available.  The chi squared only allows us to look at 
total interventions during and after the Cold War with statistical significance.  Second, I look at 
T-tests between the number of Russian or United States military interventions during the Cold 
War as a percentage of total military interventions for that year compared to the percentage of 
military interventions post-Cold War. This metric looks at whether there is a difference in 
proportions between the two states in the two time periods.  In contrast with the chi squared, the 
T tests allow for comparison of the countries.  Finally, I utilize an ordinary least squares 
regression that predicts the share of military interventions utilizing variables that indicate the 
Cold War, the state, and other relevant control variables.  The regression allows for controls that 
can isolate the effect of rivalry on the share of military interventions.  
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 Summary statistics for the variables, namely the mean, standard deviation, minimum 
values and maximum values can be found below. The summary statistics are used to examine the 
distribution of the variables and look for potential skews that need to be accounted for.  I look at 
the dependent variable over time and the distribution of the dependent variable using kernel 
density estimates, which estimates the distribution of this variable for possible skews.  We need 
the dependent variable to be normally distributed to be useful for the purpose of this examination 
and thus the transformation is necessary.  Because there is a skew for the dependent variable it is 
transformed via a natural logarithm to correct for this issue.  This forces the dependent variable 
to look like a more normal bell curve, which is the expected distribution shape of most data.  For 
all data MIRU stands for military interventions by Russia/Soviet Union and MIUS stands for 
military interventions by the United States.  See below.    
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       RUCap           60    .1396508    .0505579   .0390802   .1845277
       USCap           60     .186649    .0626451   .1281606   .3639884
 PercentMIUS           60    .1096763    .0971623          0         .5
PercentMIR~a           60    .0321588    .0457824          0   .1818182
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Figure 1.  Distribution of Share of Russian Military Interventions 
 
Figure 2.  Distribution of Share of US Military Interventions. 
Figures 1 and 2 are two kernel density estimates that show that there is a clear skew to the 
data, which is accounted for in the natural logarithm that is done later in this thesis with regards 
to the regression information.  The dependent variable needs to be normally distributed for the 
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regression to work, but the distribution of the independent variables and controls do not need to 
be transformed because the central limit theory accounts for it.   
 
Figure 3.  Distribution of Share of Russian Military Interventions (Transformed). 
 
Figure 4.  Distribution of Share of US Military Interventions (Transformed). 
Figures 3 and 4 are the two kernel density estimates after the natural logarithm was used 
to transform the data into manageable and useable statistical information. 
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Figure 5.  US Capabilities over time (CINC Scores). 
 
Figure 6.  Russian Capabilities over time (CINC Scores). 
Figures 5 and 6 show the capabilities of both states over time and shows that the United 
States’ capabilities steadily decline after World War Two while the Soviet Union stays roughly 
the same until its fall.  Since the United States started off with much higher capabilities it was 
above the Soviet Union until it reached rough parity around 1980.  This is controlled for in the 
regression.   
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
U
S
C
a
p
1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
R
U
C
a
p
1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
39 
 
 
 Figure 7.  %MIRU and %MIUS over time. 
Figure 7 shows the proportion of military interventions that the Soviet Union/Russia and 
the United States conducted as a proportion to all military interventions conducted during the 
same time.  The Soviet Union/Russia is the blue line as indicated by %MIRU or military 
interventions Russia and the United States is the red line as indicated by %MIUS or military 
interventions United States.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Results 
Table 2.  Chi-square results with humanitarian 
Country 1973-1991 1992-2010 Total 
USSR/Russia 13 13 26 
United States 37 40 77 
Total 50 53 103 
Pearsons chi2 = 
0.0295 
Kendall’s tau-b =       
- .0169 
ASE = 
0.099 
P-value =  
0.864 
 
Table 3. Chi-square results without humanitarian  
Country 1973-1991 1992-2010 Total 
USSR/Russia 12 13 25 
United States 18 23 41 
Total 30 36 66 
Pearson chi2 =  
0.1052 
Kendall’s tau-b =  
- 0.0399 
ASE =  
0.123 
P value = 
0.746 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the Chi squared test conducted both with and without 
humanitarian interventions.  As indicated by a p value of 0.864 for the test including 
humanitarian interventions and 0.746 for that without humanitarian interventions, the Cold War 
41 
 
did not have a significant effect upon military interventions.  Based on this test we would tend to 
fail to reject the null hypothesis.  This test is not the most rigorous test available as control 
variables cannot be accounted for.  Thus, before a final decision is made further tests will be 
conducted.   
 
T-Test 
Table 4. T-Test of During Cold War RU vs US. 
 
Table 5. T-Test of Post Cold War RU vs US. 
 
 
In Table 4 we examine the 95% confidence interval for the difference between the United 
States during the Cold War or USpre and the Soviet Union/Russia during the Cold War or Rpre 
(the difference between the percentage of military interventions of both countries compared to 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       45
     mean(diff) = mean(Rpre - USpre)                              t =  -4.5943
                                                                              
    diff        46   -.0801474    .0174449    .1183168   -.1152831   -.0450116
                                                                              
   USpre        46    .1147827    .0152709    .1035726    .0840254      .14554
    Rpre        46    .0346353    .0072539    .0491985    .0200252    .0492455
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Paired t test
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the rest of the world during the Cold War) to find that the data shows that we are 95% confident 
that the true difference between the two is contained within the confidence interval of -0.12 and  
-.05.  Given that 0 is not contained within this confidence interval, we can say that the difference 
is statistically significant.  By examining the three directional tests of the probability, with the 
probability of the difference being larger than 0 is 1.00, the probability of the difference being 0 
is 0.000 and the probability of the difference being less than 0 is 0.000 we can see that the United 
States share of military interventions during the Cold War was higher than the Soviet 
Union/Russia’s share of the military interventions during the Cold War. 
In Table 5 we examine the 95% confidence interval for the difference between the United 
States after the Cold War or USpost and the Soviet Union/Russia during the Cold War or Rpost 
(the difference between the percentage of military interventions of both countries compared to 
the rest of the world after the Cold War) to find that the data shows that we are 95% confident 
that the true difference between the two is contained within the confidence interval of -0.12 and -
0.02.  Given that 0 is not contained within this confidence interval, we can say that the difference 
is statistically significant.  By examining the three directional tests of the probability, with the 
probability of the difference being larger than 0 is 0.99, the probability of the difference being 0 
is 0.01 and the probability of the difference being less than 0 is 0.005 we can see that the United 
States share of military interventions after the Cold War was higher than the Soviet 
Union/Russia’s share of the military interventions after the Cold War. 
Based on the results of these two tables we find support for the hypothesis that the United 
States was more interventionist than the Soviet Union/Russia during the Cold War and reject the 
hypothesis that the Soviet Union was more interventionist during the Cold War.  We also find 
support for hypothesis that the United States was more interventionist after the Cold War than 
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the Soviet Union and reject the hypothesis that the Soviet Union was more interventionist after 
the Cold War.   
 
Regression. 
Table 6. Predicting the Russian Share of MIs.   
 
Table 7. Predicting the US Share of MIs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -4.445307    .408892   -10.87   0.000    -5.293297   -3.597316
       RUCap      14.7046   4.720767     3.11   0.005     4.914328    24.49487
       USCap     4.558231     1.6033     2.84   0.009      1.23319    7.883272
          CW    -1.480366   .5567561    -2.66   0.014    -2.635008   -.3257249
                                                                              
          TD        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    8.09092284        25  .323636913   Root MSE        =    .44864
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3781
    Residual    4.42814252        22  .201279206   R-squared       =    0.4527
       Model    3.66278031         3  1.22092677   Prob > F        =    0.0036
                                                   F(3, 22)        =      6.07
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        26
       _cons    -3.104627   .4018422    -7.73   0.000    -3.915019   -2.294235
       RUCap     12.82847   6.063129     2.12   0.040     .6010084    25.05594
       USCap     1.103242   1.646074     0.67   0.506    -2.216383    4.422867
          CW    -1.340669    .706222    -1.90   0.064    -2.764901    .0835635
                                                                              
          TF        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    17.5789712        46  .382151548   Root MSE        =    .59713
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0670
    Residual    15.3320319        43  .356558881   R-squared       =    0.1278
       Model    2.24693931         3  .748979771   Prob > F        =    0.1142
                                                   F(3, 43)        =      2.10
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        47
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Table 8. Predicting the US and Russian Share of MIs. 
 
 
Tables 6 through 8 utilize regressions to examine United States and Russian share of 
military interventions both singly and together.  In Table 6 the probability of obtaining the data 
given that there is no relationship between the Cold War and the dependent variable, or military 
interventions, is low at 0.014.  We can safely reject the null hypothesis that the Cold War had no 
effect and find that the Cold War is a statistically significant explanatory variable with respect to 
Russian military interventions.   
In Table 7 the probability of obtaining the data given there is no relationship between the 
Cold War and the dependent variable, or military intervention is 0.064.  Given that the accepted 
cutoff is 0.05 we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the Cold War had no effect and find that 
the Cold War is not quite statistically significant with respect to United States military 
interventions, though it is quite close as it would be within a 90% confidence interval. 
In Table 8 the probability of obtaining the data given there is no relationship between the 
Cold War and the dependent variable, or military intervention is 0.068.  Given that the accepted 
cutoff is 0.05 we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the Cold War had no effect and find that 
       _cons    -2.852215   .3917403    -7.28   0.000    -3.639447   -2.064984
       RUCap      11.3998    5.38191     2.12   0.039     .5844419    22.21515
       USCap     1.048566     1.4355     0.73   0.469     -1.83618    3.933312
          CW    -1.202745   .6439555    -1.87   0.068    -2.496823    .0913317
                                                                              
       TBoth        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    19.0503572        52  .366353024   Root MSE        =    .59144
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0452
    Residual    17.1402895        49  .349801827   R-squared       =    0.1003
       Model    1.91006773         3  .636689242   Prob > F        =    0.1558
                                                   F(3, 49)        =      1.82
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        53
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the Cold War is not quite statistically significant with respect to interventions by both states.  
Again, this is quite close to being statistically significant and would be with some studies.   
In all three regressions, the Cold War or CW has a negative coefficient, which would 
suggest that it actually has a constraining effect.   
 
Conclusions 
 
 This study endeavored to examine military intervention utilizing two different methods.  
It incorporated a qualitative approach with a case study and a quantitative approach through data 
analysis and statistical evidence.   
In the qualitative study, we looked at the United States and Soviet military interventions 
in Afghanistan.  We found that there was no substantive difference between the two 
interventions in Afghanistan even though one occurred during the Cold War and one occurred 
after the Cold War and were conducted by countries with vastly different economic and 
ideological behaviors.  Both interventions followed the same general level of intensity, troop 
counts, and followed similar timelines, leading to similar results.  There were minor differences 
in tactics of the initial invasion because the Soviets used mainly ground troops to take strategic 
sites while the United States relied on airstrikes to take out key targets and initially focused their 
ground forces on Kabul.  Both interventions had periods of intensive operations and maintained 
large forces within the country for the majority of the occupation, with the Soviets deploying 
110,000 troops at the peak and the United States deploying 90,000 at its peak.  Supporting this 
level of involvement was expensive, and thus both states ultimately became disenchanted with 
the conflict, which led to the withdrawal phase.  In both cases the withdrawal occurred relatively 
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quickly, though the United States maintained a marginal troop level for several years.  Although 
there were small differences in the methods of intervention utilized by the Soviet Union and the 
United States, they followed the same general course and they fell to the same fatal flaw, 
asymmetric warfare. Each country has powerful state militaries which were designed to counter 
other similar militaries and to fight conventional battles.  They were ultimately frustrated by the 
guerilla tactics of the local forces in Afghanistan.  Because of the similarities between the 
conduct and outcome of these wars despite the change in time period and circumstance, one 
could conclude that the Cold War had no effect upon military interventions. 
When looking at the quantitative portion of this thesis several interesting and surprising 
findings were uncovered.  Each hypothesis will be examined in turn.  We fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of our main theory, namely that the Cold War had no effect on the absolute rate of 
military interventions by both countries.  This is surprising as I expected to find that the Cold 
War increased the rate of military interventions but the data indicated there was no effect when 
considering both countries.  We also fail to reject the null hypothesis with respect to the Soviet 
United States and the effect the Cold War had on the rate of interventions when looking at the 
country alone.  Interestingly, we do reject the null hypothesis when examining the Soviet 
Union/Russia alone.  The Cold War did have an effect on the Soviet Union/Russia’s rate of 
military interventions and it is the opposite of what I expected.  I expected, due to the rivalry 
inherent in the Cold War between the two parties, that there would have been more interventions 
but in the case of the Russia it seems to have had a constraining effect.  According to the 
regressions the Cold War had a constraining effect because the coefficient was negative.  
Examining why this phenomenon occurs is beyond the scope of this study but a possible reason 
for this could be that the rivalry would tend to inhibit interventions, possible due to fear of 
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reprisal or response by the rival.  Another interesting result of our examination is the conclusion 
that the United States is a more interventionist state than the Soviet Union/Russia.  There are 
many possible reasons for why the United States is generally more interventionist.  It could be 
they have a more advanced and better funded military, a larger alliance structure, their position 
as the superpower or any other number of things.  This study could not control for these variables 
and future studies into this topic could look further into teasing out causal mechanisms for these 
results and for examining why the United States intervenes so much, even when compared to 
their one-time fellow superpower.   
As this paper utilizes the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia as proxies for 
military intervention in general, due to their position as the states with the highest rate of 
intervention, our attempt to generalize failed due to the failure to reject the null hypothesis.  And 
yet the United States’ increases in interventions following the end of the Cold War is interesting 
as it could lead to several other potential theories on intervention.  Why did the United States 
become more interventionist after the end of the Cold War?  Was it due to the lack of a 
constraining factor, in this instance the Soviet Union?  Why was there no change in the rate of 
interventions by the Soviet Union/Russia?  Was it due to their lack of power and their high 
instability that existed during the 1990s?  As Russia continues to expand their influence and to 
become at least a regional power, will we see an upswing in their rate of interventions, such as 
their current interventions in Syria and Ukraine?  This research has uncovered some interesting 
and unexpected finding and it is my hope that these questions will be examined further in future 
research.  
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APPENDIX: 
DATA USED FOR STUDY 
 
 
Country Time Period target start end
United States Pre-1991 352 19740722 19740724
United States Pre-1991 800 19750514 19750515
United States Pre-1991 811 19750515 19750516
United States Pre-1991 660 19760620 19760621
United States Pre-1991 490 19780519 19790831
United States Pre-1991 110 19781121 19781126
United States Pre-1991 93 19790614 19790615
United States Pre-1991 94 19790708 19790710
United States Pre-1991 145 19791108 19791108
United States Pre-1991 630 19800425 19800425
United States Pre-1991 31 19800513 19800513
United States Pre-1991 420 19810808 19810809
United States Pre-1991 660 19820624 19820624
United States Pre-1991 660 19820825 19820901
United States Pre-1991 660 19820829 19840330
United States Pre-1991 92 19830202 19881231
United States Pre-1991 483 19830731 19830815
United States Pre-1991 55 19831025 19831216
United States Pre-1991 625 19840323 19840331
United States Pre-1991 670 19840815 19841231
United States Pre-1991 651 19840817 19841231
United States Pre-1991 625 19850322 19850323
United States Pre-1991 325 19851010 19851010
United States Pre-1991 31 19851231 99999999
United States Pre-1991 620 19860324 19860415
United States Pre-1991 145 19860714 19861115
United States Pre-1991 91 19861207 19880320
United States Pre-1991 90 19870503 19870504
United States Pre-1991 91 19880317 19880331
United States Pre-1991 95 19880402 19881231
United States Pre-1991 660 19890906 19890906
United States Pre-1991 840 19891201 19891209
United States Pre-1991 95 19891220 19900228
United States Pre-1991 450 19900805 19910110
United States Pre-1991 670 19900808 19910115
United States Pre-1991 690 19900811 19910406
United States Pre-1991 645 19910222 19910228
United States Post-1991 451 19920503 19920503
United States Post-1991 520 19921209 19940325
United States Post-1991 346 19930228 19960109
United States Post-1991 490 19940730 19940930
United States Post-1991 517 19940730 19940930
United States Post-1991 41 19940919 19950331
United States Post-1991 690 19941008 19941224
United States Post-1991 450 19960409 19960618
United States Post-1991 482 19960521 19960731
United States Post-1991 690 19960918 19961215
United States Post-1991 339 19970312 19970314
United States Post-1991 451 19970530 19970601
United States Post-1991 484 19970610 19970618
United States Post-1991 531 19980606 19980609
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United States Post-1991 910 19980723 19980801
United States Post-1991 710 19980810 19980810
United States Post-1991 625 19980820 19980820
United States Post-1991 700 19980820 19980820
United States Post-1991 450 19980925 19980925
United States Post-1991 700 20011007 20011208
United States Post-1991 700 20011220 88888888
United States Post-1991 437 20020925 20020929
United States Post-1991 645 20030320 88888888
United States Post-1991 450 20030811 20030930
United States Post-1991 41 20040229 20040601
United States Post-1991 770 20040502 20040420
United States Post-1991 800 20041230 20050401
United States Post-1991 850 20041230 20050126
United States Post-1991 780 20050103 20050215
United States Post-1991 41 20050201 20050513
United States Post-1991 770 20051010 20060330
United States Post-1991 20061030 20101217
United States Post-1991 20070111 20070611
United States Post-1991 20070828 20070829
United States Post-1991 20070122 20070227
United States Post-1991 20080302 20080302
United States Post-1991 20081026 20081026
United States Post-1991 20080129 20090312
United States Post-1991 20090225 20090225
United States Post-1991 20100927 20101126
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 652 19730430 19730630
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 698 19731231 19731231
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 645 19731231 19750305
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 540 19751110 19881231
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 530 19771231 19791231
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 40 19780213 99999999
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 700 19790731 19791211
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 700 19791211 19881231
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 770 19800930 19820228
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 652 19830331 19881231
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 770 19830918 19881231
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 680 19840819 19841231
USSR/Russia Pre-1991 670 19900813 19910115
USSR/Russia Post-1991 700 19910731 19951231
USSR/Russia Post-1991 359 19920622 88888888
USSR/Russia Post-1991 372 19920721 88888888
USSR/Russia Post-1991 372 19930221 19930814
USSR/Russia Post-1991 372 19931020 19931106
USSR/Russia Post-1991 372 19940623 88888888
USSR/Russia Post-1991 531 19980606 19980607
USSR/Russia Post-1991 345 19990611 19990619
USSR/Russia Post-1991 372 20020730 20020823
USSR/Russia Post-1991 20060816 20060816
USSR/Russia Post-1991 20070806 20100924
USSR/Russia Post-1991 20090130 20090130
USSR/Russia Post-1991 20090219 20090219
56 
 
 
Year Total MI MIRU %MIRU MIUS %MIUS %MIBoth USCap RUCap
1946 13 1 0.076923077 0 0 0.076923 0.363988 0.122541
1947 6 0 0 1 0.166667 0.166667 0.309942 0.145217
1948 27 0 0 1 0.037037 0.037037 0.29466 0.164
1949 7 0 0 0 0 0 0.273166 0.167918
1950 16 0 0 2 0.125 0.125 0.284443 0.180599
1951 9 0 0 1 0.111111 0.111111 0.3195 0.173163
1952 3 0 0 0 0 0 0.311367 0.170199
1953 7 1 0.142857143 1 0.142857 0.285714 0.311158 0.173121
1954 9 0 0 0 0 0 0.28094 0.184528
1955 4 0 0 2 0.5 0.5 0.266423 0.179166
1956 13 2 0.153846154 3 0.230769 0.384615 0.260614 0.170197
1957 14 0 0 2 0.142857 0.142857 0.255049 0.167267
1958 18 0 0 5 0.277778 0.277778 0.23447 0.170953
1959 8 0 0 2 0.25 0.25 0.228965 0.171201
1960 8 0 0 1 0.125 0.125 0.215444 0.17179
1961 11 1 0.090909091 3 0.272727 0.363636 0.210655 0.173759
1962 16 1 0.0625 2 0.125 0.1875 0.209911 0.176337
1963 23 0 0 2 0.086957 0.086957 0.207967 0.17128
1964 27 0 0 6 0.222222 0.222222 0.202983 0.167494
1965 25 0 0 3 0.12 0.12 0.201539 0.164547
1966 15 1 0.066666667 1 0.066667 0.133333 0.20867 0.166316
1967 22 2 0.090909091 2 0.090909 0.181818 0.208548 0.166741
1968 13 1 0.076923077 0 0 0.076923 0.203926 0.169985
1969 21 1 0.047619048 1 0.047619 0.095238 0.197547 0.169439
1970 11 2 0.181818182 0 0 0.181818 0.179844 0.172923
1971 11 0 0 0 0 0 0.168882 0.174019
1972 16 0 0 0 0 0 0.163286 0.172377
1973 29 3 0.103448276 0 0 0.103448 0.157198 0.168881
1974 13 0 0 1 0.076923 0.076923 0.151321 0.169067
1975 23 1 0.043478261 2 0.086957 0.130435 0.142502 0.176149
1976 20 0 0 1 0.05 0.05 0.140885 0.177637
1977 24 1 0.041666667 0 0 0.041667 0.140172 0.17514
1978 20 1 0.05 2 0.1 0.15 0.138162 0.172273
1979 23 2 0.086956522 3 0.130435 0.217391 0.135674 0.168808
1980 22 1 0.045454545 2 0.090909 0.136364 0.131705 0.170027
1981 18 0 0 1 0.055556 0.055556 0.136528 0.170866
1982 23 0 0 3 0.130435 0.130435 0.128161 0.172665
1983 15 2 0.133333333 3 0.2 0.333333 0.131504 0.173288
1984 20 1 0.05 3 0.15 0.2 0.13134 0.164892
1985 12 0 0 3 0.25 0.25 0.133253 0.170436
1986 14 0 0 3 0.214286 0.214286 0.132095 0.169235
1987 10 0 0 1 0.1 0.1 0.131279 0.167673
1988 7 0 0 2 0.285714 0.285714 0.132756 0.165073
1989 22 0 0 3 0.136364 0.136364 0.146693 0.131293
1990 60 1 0.016666667 3 0.05 0.066667 0.139376 0.123861
1991 32 1 0.03125 1 0.03125 0.0625 0.135599 0.097295
1992 29 2 0.068965517 2 0.068966 0.137931 0.146081 0.065221
1993 23 2 0.086956522 1 0.043478 0.130435 0.15271 0.056026
1994 24 1 0.041666667 4 0.166667 0.208333 0.144825 0.065154
1995 16 0 0 0 0 0 0.140641 0.061081
1996 14 0 0 3 0.214286 0.214286 0.138339 0.056931
1997 33 0 0 3 0.090909 0.090909 0.13966 0.053965
1998 42 1 0.023809524 6 0.142857 0.166667 0.141734 0.049232
1999 23 1 0.043478261 0 0 0.043478 0.142888 0.049467
2000 7 0 0 0 0 0 0.142951 0.049524
2001 19 0 0 2 0.105263 0.105263 0.142012 0.051414
2002 14 1 0.071428571 1 0.071429 0.142857 0.14346 0.047563
2003 47 0 0 2 0.042553 0.042553 0.142094 0.047298
2004 24 0 0 4 0.166667 0.166667 0.143169 0.045459
2005 16 0 0 3 0.1875 0.1875 0.14829 0.03908
